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People sometimes make their admirable deeds and accomplishments hard to spot, such as
by giving anonymously or avoiding bragging. Such “buried” signals are hard to reconcile
with standard models of signaling or indirect reciprocity, which motivate costly pro-social
behavior by reputational gains. To explain these phenomena, we design a simple game the-
ory model, which we call the signal-burying game. This game has the feature that senders
can bury their signal by deliberately reducing the probability of the signal being observed.
If the signal is observed, however, it is identified as having been buried. We show under
which conditions buried signals can be maintained, using static equilibrium concepts and
calculations of the evolutionary dynamics. We apply our analysis to shed light on a number
of otherwise puzzling social phenomena, including modesty, anonymous donations, sub-
tlety in art and fashion, and over-eagerness.
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Many donors give substantial amounts while purposely withholding their names, including
17 anonymous gifts in the U.S. of over 10 Million USD in 20171. Such anonymous dona-
tions are considered particularly virtuous by Maimonides and other religious and philosophical
authorities2. However, this form of charitable giving is hard to reconcile with standard evolu-
tionary accounts of pro-social behavior3–5. If we give in order to gain reputational benefits6,7,
why would we ever wish to hide the fact that we gave? If others have an incentive to reward
us for giving, why would they ever prefer us to hide our gifts? Similarly, we strive hard to ac-
complish greatness, which we do partly to attract partners8,9. And yet, we sometimes actively
hide these accomplishments, and others consider it more commendable when we do so10. We
see similar puzzles in fashion where people are willing to pay considerable amounts to receive a
name brand item, only to make sure the brand is relatively hard to spot11,12. Likewise, an artist
might put thought and effort into conveying an idea, but then ensure the idea is hard to decipher,
for example by not giving a title or informative description to the abstract painting or musical
composition. And finally when we are interested in someone as a partner, we often subdue our
level of interest, and those who play ‘hard to get’ are seen as more attractive13,14. While it is
clear that seeming too interested may signal desperation, it is unclear why and when subduing
one’s interest would be worth the potentially lost opportunity.
Our explanation is based on the intuition that making a positive signal harder to spot can
serve as a signal in itself: burying a signal may indicate a lack of interest in those who might have
been impressed by the signal but now are less liable to notice it; alternatively, burying may also
signal confidence that receivers are liable to find out anyways. As we show below, it is precisely
this information that buried signals convey, which is different from the information conveyed
by simply choosing a more costly signal, as in classical signaling models8,9. We formalize the
above intuition using a simple game theory model, which we call the signal-burying game. In
so doing, we join a growing literature that attempts to explain puzzling aspects of human moral
and social behaviors using evolutionary game theory15–19. Our model is also closely related to
the large signaling literature that rationalizes seemingly counterintuitive behaviors by carefully
analyzing which information these behaviors convey in a given context.20–25
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The signal-burying game is an asymmetric game between a sender and a receiver (see Fig. 1a).
The sender can be one of three different types, referred to as high (h), medium (m), and low (l).
The probability that a randomly chosen sender is of a given type is determined by the probability
distribution p = (ph, pm, pl) with ph+pm+pl = 1. Similarly, there are two different types of
receivers, called strongly selective and weakly selective, or in short, strong (s) and weak (w).
The probability of each receiver type is given by the probability distribution q = (qs, qw) with
qs+qw=1. Players know their own type and the probability distributions p and q, but they cannot
directly observe the type of their co-player.
In the beginning of the signal-burying game, a sender and a receiver are randomly matched
(with their types independently drawn from the respective distributions p and q). Senders can
then decide whether they wish to convey their type by sending a costly signal. Specifically, they
can choose among three options: (i) They can decide not to send a signal, and hence not to pay
any cost. (ii) They can send a clear signal at cost ci≥0, with the cost depending on the sender’s
type i∈{l,m, h}. Clear signals are always observed by the receiver. (iii) They can send a buried
signal. Such senders pay the same cost ci to obtain the signal (e.g., a university degree), but in
addition they make sure the signal is not directly observable. Instead, receivers only observe a
buried signal with probability ri, with i∈{l,m, h}. If the buried signal is observed, it is tagged
as having been buried. Otherwise, if the signal goes unnoticed, the receiver cannot tell whether
the sender has sent a buried signal or no signal at all. After the sender has made his decision,
the receiver chooses whether or not to accept the sender as a partner, based on the signal she
observes. Payoffs for partnering depend on the players’ types but are independent of the signal:
senders receive a payoff aij , whereas receivers obtain bij , with i ∈ {l,m, h} and j ∈ {s, w}.
In particular, we allow different receivers to value the same sender type differently. Such a
heterogeneity could arise, for example, if different receiver types have different outside options,
or if they are looking for different kinds of partnerships.
We assume that senders always wish to partner, aij > 0 for all i and j. Conversely, strong
receivers only get a positive payoff from partnering with a high sender (bls, bms < 0 < bhs),
and weak receivers only get a positive payoff from partnering with a high or medium sender
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(blw<0<bmw, bhw). To keep the analysis simple, we additionally assume that the signaling cost
cl for low types is prohibitively high such that they can always be assumed to send no signal.
Moreover, we assume that neither type of receiver would be willing to partner with a mixture of
high and low types of senders. This model can also encompass cases in which a sender’s fixed
trait may serve as a signal. In that case we simply assume that the signaling cost is zero for
individuals who have the trait, whereas it is prohibitively large for individuals who lack it.
In the SI we give a full description of the model, and we provide a complete equilibrium anal-
ysis. Furthermore, we consider equilibrium refinements, support our static results with extensive
evolutionary simulations, and we discuss various model extensions. Below we summarize our
key insights.
We first ask under which conditions our base model allows for equilibria such that (i) high
senders bury their signal (ii) medium senders send a clear signal, and (iii) low senders send no
signal. For any such equilibrium, it follows from our assumptions that strong receivers only
accept those senders who choose to bury (and whose buried signal becomes revealed), whereas
weak receivers additionally accept senders with a clear signal (see Fig. 1b and SI). For there to
be such a burying equilibrium, four conditions need to be met. First, high senders need to prefer
sending a buried signal to a clear signal. In equilibrium, burying allows high senders to gain ac-
cess to some strong receivers (who would have rejected the clear signal, but accept buried signals
when they are revealed). However, burying also causes high senders to lose some weak receivers
(who would have accepted the clear signal, but now may fail to notice the buried signal). High
senders thus prefer to bury if
rhqsahs + rhqwahw ≥ qwahw. (1)
Conversely, medium senders need to prefer the clear signal over burying,
rmqsams + rmqwamw ≤ qwamw. (2)
Finally, both sender types need to be willing to pay the cost of the signal in the first place (note
that the cost ci is independent of whether or not the signal is buried),
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rh(qsahs + qwahw) ≥ ch, (3)
qwamw ≥ cm. (4)
Whereas the last two conditions can also be found in standard signaling models8 (where ch/rh
needs to be interpreted as the higher cost of the more elaborate signal), the first two conditions
represent the key insight of our model.
Combined, the first two conditions require that either (i) high senders especially value part-
nering with strong receivers, or (ii) that it is more likely that their buried signals become revealed
(Fig. 1c). Each of these two mechanisms can independently ensure that high senders find it worth
to bury: Both of them decrease the high sender’s opportunity cost (1−rh)qwahw of burying, while
increasing their expected gains rhqsahs. The first case is tantamount to saying that high senders
need to prefer those receivers who especially care about them. This seems to be a natural as-
sumption if the success and longevity of interactions depends on the parties’ shared values and
goals26. This interpretation is also in line with observations that wealthy consumers low in need
for status tend to associate with their own kind and that they pay a premium for quiet goods only
they can recognize11,12. If this condition is what drives burying, then there is a natural interpre-
tation: sending a costly signal allows one to separate oneself from those with inordinate costs,
and burying one’s signal allows one to separate oneself from those who benefit inordinately from
weak receivers. We note that while this first mechanism is unique to our model, the second
mechanism shares similarities to models of counter signaling and strategic disclosure23–25 (we
compare our model to this literature in more detail in the discussion).
In signaling games, classical equilibrium concepts often have the problem that they do not
constrain the receivers’ expectations about behaviors that do not occur in equilibrium. There-
fore, we have explored which equilibria additionally satisfy the intuitive criterion27 (IC). The
IC imposes a further rationality requirement on receivers: if certain sender types cannot possibly
gain from sending a given signal, receivers should assign zero probability that the signal was sent
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by one of those sender types. We prove in the SI that when the above conditions (1) – (4) are
satisfied, the burying equilibrium is the only equilibrium that meets the IC if, in addition, strong
receivers avoid mixtures of medium and high senders (if phbhs+pmbms<0). Otherwise there can
be another equilibrium that satisfies the IC, in which both medium and high senders send clear
signals and are accepted by both receivers (Fig. 2a).
This equilibrium analysis is further supported by an evolutionary analysis. Evolutionary anal-
yses are particularly relevant when strategies are not consciously chosen, but instead propagate
via learning or evolutionary processes, as is arguably the case for our ideologies, tastes, and emo-
tions, including our artistic sense or moral intuitions related to anonymous giving15,28. We have
therefore simulated the strategy dynamics under a pairwise imitation process29. We consider
two finite populations of senders and receivers. The proportion of high, medium, and low types
within the sender population is given by the distribution p, whereas the proportion of strong and
weak types in the receiver population is given by q. Initially, senders use no signal and receivers
reject everybody. In each iterative step of the simulation, one player is randomly chosen from
one of the two populations and given the chance to revise her strategy. When chosen for updat-
ing, with probability µ the player adopts a randomly chosen strategy out of the set of all available
strategies (corresponding to a mutation in biological models). With the converse probability 1−µ,
the player considers imitating the strategy of another player of the same type. Imitation events
are biased towards strategies that yield higher payoffs (corresponding to selection). The exact
revision protocol is provided in the Methods. When simulating this process, we find that in the
parameter region in which no other equilibrium satisfies the IC, populations quickly settle at the
burying equilibrium (Fig. 2b; see also Fig. 3 for representative sample trajectories).
The unique incentive structure in the burying equilibrium enables specific information to be
conveyed that is not conveyed by classical costly signals. To formalize this argument, we have
extended our base model such that high senders can either distinguish themselves by burying, or
by sending an alternative signal that is more costly than the clear signal (Fig. 4, for details see SI).
Separation through classical costly signaling either requires that compared to medium senders,
high senders have a lower cost of sending the alternative signal, or that they value strong receivers
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more. In contrast, separation through burying requires that high senders have a higher revelation
probability, or that they value strong receivers more relative to the weak receivers (Fig. 4d).
Thus, burying is especially useful when one wishes to convey that one’s hidden qualities are
likely to be revealed anyway, or that one does not particularly care about the weak receivers who
may not spot these qualities.
Our base model can easily be adapted to cover more general scenarios. For example, in
many applications senders have some discretion about how much they would like to bury their
signals (how likely their buried signal will be revealed). To gain traction on this question we
have extended our model by allowing senders to choose between multiple burying devices with
different revelation probabilities. If a buried signal becomes revealed, receivers do not only learn
that the signal was buried, but also which burying device has been used. Fig. 5a illustrates
this model extension for the special case where the sender can choose among two revelation
probabilities (see SI for the general case with arbitrarily many feasible revelation probabilities).
By repeating the previous equilibrium analysis for this extended model, we find that high senders
tend to be modest, but not too modest (Fig. 5b,c): when given the chance, high senders learn to
choose the signal with the highest revelation probability (subject to the constraint that the buried
signal still allows them to differentiate themselves from medium senders).
With another model extension we can capture that some receiver types may decipher buried
signals more easily than others (as for example when it comes to grasp the true cost of a logo-less
designer bag, see Fig. S3). In addition, we also characterize the burying equilibrium for cases in
which different sender types have a different likelihood to meet a given receiver type. Similarly,
our base model can be extended to accommodate for more than three types of senders and two
types of receivers (Fig. S4). Finally, in the SI we discuss a model extension that suggests an
alternative interpretation for burying. While in the model presented herein, burying serves the
purpose of impressing certain types of receivers, we can also formulate our main results in terms
of a model with one receiver type only. In that model, the sender’s payoff depends nonlinearly
on the receiver’s ex-post belief of the sender’s type. While the base model suggests that burying
occurs when high senders specifically care about strong receivers but not about weak ones, the
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alternative model suggests that they need to care about some distinctions but not about others:
they might care a lot about being seen as high and not as medium, but they might not further
bother about being taken for a medium or for a low type.
We can now apply our model to shed light on our motivating puzzles, starting with anony-
mous donations. While donors may prefer anonymity to avoid being harassed for further dona-
tions, this argument alone would not explain why anonymous donors are seen as more virtuous.
However, donations are never fully anonymous. These donations are often revealed to the recip-
ient, the inner circle of friends, or fellow do-gooders (who correspond to the strongly selective
types in our model). These few privy observers, in turn, do not only learn that the donor is gen-
erous (sends the costly signal); they are also likely to infer that the generosity was not motivated
by immediate fame or the desire for recognition from the masses (that is, the donor does not care
about the weak receivers).
An analogous conclusion holds for modesty. For example, a man who does not draw attention
to his substantial wealth when he is first getting to know a potential suitor, may signal that he does
not need to impress her with this information, either because he has many other suitors lined up in
case she does not find out (i.e. the opportunity cost from missing out on the weak receiver is low),
because he is not interested in spending his time with a woman who is sufficiently impressed by
wealth alone (i.e., the weak receiver), or because he has so many positive attributes that he can
afford for one to go unnoticed (which is maybe best reflected in terms of our model by assuming
that r is large).
When researchers brag about their most recent publication, this might show they have been
productive, but it also signals that they don’t expect their article to be sufficiently important for
their colleagues to take notice on their own. Moreover, we often infer that someone who brags
is “in it for the wrong reasons”. What do we mean by this? In light of our model, bragging may
indicate that the primary motive for the accomplishment was merely to impress the weakly se-
lective receivers. For instance, an academic who brags incessantly about her recent publications
and awards may come off as being driven by attention and fame, instead of the promotion of
science, which may make her less desirable as an editor, dean, or collaborator (i.e. to selective
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receivers, compared to the weakly selective public).
Be´nabou and Tirole21 provide an alternative interpretation for such an inference. In their
model, players have three different motives to choose a certain action: the intrinsic value they
attribute to the action, any extrinsic incentives for taking it (such as subsidies), and the action’s
reputational value. In their model, increasing the publicity of good deeds generally encourages
social behavior. However, when players differ in the relative weight attributed to these three mo-
tives, good actions also increasingly become suspected of being driven by appearances only. In
contrast to our model, Be´nabou and Tirole21 treat the extent to which good actions are observed
as an exogenous parameter, not as an option that players can use strategically. As a consequence,
they do not address why senders would create a signal that is specifically targeted at some re-
ceiver types at the risk of losing others.
Others have attempted to explain modesty as a “counter signal”23. Classic examples of
counter signals include Mark Zuckerberg and Steve Jobs, who did not find it necessary to con-
form to the typical fashion habits of managers to impress people (which made them even more
impressive for some observers). In a similar model of strategic disclosure, Harbaugh and To24
present data suggesting that faculty in more prestigious universities tend to avoid mentioning
their titles in their voicemails, and that they would actively substitute “instructor” for “profes-
sor” in course syllabi. In counter signaling models, higher types find it easier to distinguish
themselves from lower types than medium types do (for example, because receivers obtain some
noisy private information about the sender’s type, in addition to the sender’s publicly sent sig-
nal23,24). As a consequence, medium types may have more of an incentive to send the public
signal. In our model, senders bury because they are confident their signal will be seen anyway,
whereas with a counter signal, senders are confident their qualities shine through even when they
do not send a signal at all. Counter signaling models are thus unable to explain why individuals
would be willing to pay the cost of a signal without revealing it. In addition, counter signaling
is usually not interpreted as a way to get access to certain receivers at the cost of losing others
(although an appropriate modification of these models might yield such a result).
Turning now to our third application, what might artists be signaling by purposely leaving
9
it open which messages are hidden in their work? Our model allows for several interpretations:
the artist might be signaling that she does not care what her average contemporary (the weak
receivers) thinks of her work; she might be sufficiently confident in her reputation as a good
artist that art critics will scavenge to find the buried meaning (which may be approximated by
having a larger r); or there may be so many buried insights that some are bound to be spotted even
if they are not pointed out (which again may be approximated by assuming that r is large). In
fashion, likewise, subtlety is often appreciated and actively sought out11,12. Wearing an expensive
handbag with a large brand symbol on it may signal wealth, but also that you want all observers
to notice that you are wealthy, and not just those who themselves are wealthy and sophisticated
enough to know the subtle signals of expense.
Finally, turning to overeagerness, when we are interested in someone as a partner, we are
often advised to “play hard to get” or “seem disinterested”13,14. One could interpret such be-
haviors as part of a negotiation, where people should understate their true interest to increase
their bargaining power in the later relationship. However, such an intuition cannot explain why
overeagerness is often seen as unbecoming; if it only was about bargaining, receivers should
happily accept senders who fail to play down their interest. Alternatively, and more in line with
our model, overeagerness might be taken as a cue that the sender’s mate value is low, and that
the sender is in need of this partnership. However, the question remains when it is worth being
honest or deceptive about the fact that one actually benefits from this partnership; an equilibrium
analysis is needed to know precisely when it is worth hiding one’s interest, and how that behavior
is sustained and interpreted in equilibrium. By understating their interest, senders may indicate
that they have many other potential suitors, or that they are confident that even their subtle sig-
nals will suffice. But how can it convey this information in equilibrium, if everyone does as they
are advised and plays down their interest? It must be that there is an opportunity cost to playing
down one’s interest that depends on one’s type, which our model helps elucidate: the cost is
the lost relationships with weakly selective receivers. This cost is worth bearing when there is
a high chance that one’s subtle signals will be noted eventually, or when one is not particularly
interested in weakly selective receivers anyway.
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Methods
Static analysis. To explore under which condition individuals bury their signals, we have char-
acterized all perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibria (PBNE) of the signal-burying game (for all details,
see SI). The PBNE is the standard way game theorists solve signaling games. In a PBNE, the
strategy of each type of each player is specified in such a way that no player can gain, in expected
value, given her preferences and her information, and given that the other players act as specified.
A PBNE can be interpreted as a necessary condition for a strategy profile to be sensible – if it
is not a PBNE, then some type of player could benefit from deviating. Equivalently, if strategies
are learned or evolved, a mutation or experimentation that leads her to behave differently would
succeed and propagate.
Evolutionary simulations. We have modeled the evolution of strategies using a stochastic imita-
tion process. There are two populations, a sender population of sizeNS and a receiver population
of size NR. Each of these populations is divided into smaller subpopulations: for senders, there
is a subpopulation of high type senders of size phNS , of medium senders of pmNS , and of low
senders with size plNS (the proportions ph, pm, pl are constant in time and satisfy ph+pm+pl=1).
Similarly, the receiver population consists of strong receivers of size qsNR, and of weak receivers
of size qwNR (again with qs and qw being constant and qs+qw=1). Within each population, in-
dividuals choose among the strategies described in the main text. Senders can thus either send
no signal, send a clear signal, or send a buried signal (yielding 3 possible strategies), whereas
receivers need to decide whether or not to accept each signal type (yielding 23 = 8 possible
strategies). To calculate the players’ payoffs in each time step, all individuals of the sender pop-
ulation are matched with all individuals of the receiver population, playing the game according
to their predefined strategy.
We employ a simple pairwise comparison process29 to model how the players’ strategies
change over time. In each time step, some individual i is chosen randomly from one of the two
populations (with all individuals having the same probability to be chosen). This player is then
given the chance to update its strategy. With probability µ > 0 (the mutation rate), the player
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adopts a random strategy out of the set of available strategies. With probability 1 − µ, player
i instead considers imitating a co-player. To this end, the player randomly chooses some other
individual j from the same subpopulation. If player i’s payoff in that period is pii and if player j’s







The parameter β > 0 corresponds to the strength of selection. If β→ 0, called the limit of weak
selection, then ρ → 1/2 independent of the payoffs, and strategy updating essentially occurs
at random. As β increases, strategy updating increasingly favors those strategies that lead to a
higher payoff, pij>pii. Taken together, these two elementary updating processes of imitation and
mutation give rise to an ergodic stochastic process.
We have analyzed this stochastic process with computer simulations. These simulations were
typically run for at least 2 · 106 time steps for each parameter combination. Unless stated oth-
erwise, we have used population sizes NS =NR = 300, with ph = 0.2, pm = 0.3, pl = 0.5, and
qs = qw = 0.5. The costs of the signal were ch = cm = 1, and cl = 100 (incorporating our as-
sumption that signals are too costly for low senders). We considered the case of equal revelation
probabilities for all senders, rh=rm=rl=1/3. The payoffs for partnering were
ahs = 12, ahw = 3, ams = 4, amw = 4, als = 1, alw = 1,
bhs = 6, bhw = 6, bms = −10, bmw = 4, bls = −10, blw = −10.
These parameters have been chosen as they satisfy the restrictions for a burying equilibrium,
as stated in (1) – (4). Other parameters might affect the quantitative outcomes, but all simu-
lations we have performed were in good qualitative agreement with the results predicted from
our static equilibrium analysis, and they exhibit the same comparative statics (as an example,
see Fig. S1). Such an agreement between evolutionary results and equilibrium predictions is,
in general, not guaranteed. In signaling games, as in any game in which different strategies
may be indistinguishable along the equilibrium path, neutral drift can play an important role for
the evolutionary dynamics. For reasonable population sizes and selection strengths, even non-
equilibrium states can be reached rather frequently30. Moreover, analytical results for stochastic
population dynamics can often only be obtained under rather restrictive assumptions, such as
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rare mutations, large populations, or strong selection31,32. Our simulations can thus serve as
a robustness check when these conditions are not satisfied. For the figures in the main text,
we have used a strength of selection β = 1 and a mutation rate µ= 0.02 throughout. However,
our qualitative results are robust with respect to changes in these parameters, as shown in Fig. S2.
Code availability. The MATLAB algorithm that has been used to simulate the evolutionary dy-
namics of the baseline model (as shown in Figs. 2 and 3) is provided in the SI Appendix. The
simulations for the various model extensions (as discussed in Section 3 of the SI) only require
minor modifications of this baseline algorithm. The corresponding MATLAB files are available
from the corresponding authors upon request.
Data availability. The raw data generated by the MATLAB programs, which were used to gener-
ate the figures of our evolutionary simulations, are available with the online version of the paper
as source data.
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Figure captions
Figure 1: The signal-burying game. a, We consider a signaling game between a sender and a
receiver. Senders are either of high, medium, or low type, whereas receivers are either strongly
selective (“strong”) or weakly selective (“weak”). Players know their own type but not their
co-player’s type. To indicate their type, senders can pay a cost to send a signal. If they do, they
can additionally choose whether they want to send a clear signal (C) or bury their signal (B).
Buried signals become revealed and tagged as being buried with some probability; otherwise it
appears as if the sender has not sent a signal (N ). Based on the signal they observe, receivers
then choose whether or not to accept the sender for some economic interaction. Payoffs for part-
nering are such that senders always want to interact, whereas strong receivers only get a positive
payoff from interacting with high senders, and weak receivers only get a positive payoff from
interacting with high or medium senders. b, We define a burying equilibrium as an equilibrium
in which high senders bury their signal, medium senders send a clear signal, and low senders
send no signal. c, A burying equilibrium requires that high senders especially value interactions
with strong receivers, or that they have the higher revelation probability than medium senders,
see conditions (1)–(4) for details.
Figure 2: Evolutionary simulations are in line with the equilibrium conditions for burying.
To explore when a burying equilibrium emerges, we have varied two key parameters, the rela-
tive preference of high senders for strong receivers (measured by ahs/ahw on the y–axis), and
the relative aversion of strong receivers against medium senders (measured by −bms/bhs on the
x–axis). a, Static equilibrium considerations suggest the existence of four parameter regions.
(1) If high senders show a low preference for strong receivers, and strong receivers have a low
aversion against medium senders, the intuitive criterion27 (IC) predicts a pooling equilibrium;
both high and medium senders use a clear signal and both receivers accept this signal. (2) If
high senders show a low preference for strong receivers, but strong receivers are strongly averse
against medium senders, both sender types use a clear signal, which is only accepted by weak
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receivers. (3) If high senders highly prefer strong receivers, and strong receivers have a low aver-
sion against medium senders, there are two possible equilibrium outcomes consistent with the
IC: the pooling equilibrium accepted by both receivers and the burying equilibrium. (4) If high
senders have a high preference for strong receivers, and strong receivers have a high aversion
against medium senders, only the burying equilibrium satisfies the IC. b, To complement these
static predictions we have considered evolutionary simulations of a pairwise imitation process
(for a sample trajectory, see Fig. 3). The simulations agree with the equilibrium predictions. In
the only ambiguous case (3) where static considerations allow for two equilibria, we observe that
the pooling equilibrium is favored (as it can be easier reached from the used initial population in
which no one sends or accepts a signal).
Figure 3: Evolutionary dynamics of buried signals. To explore how players learn to bury
their signals, we show a representative simulation run for the parameter region in which only the
burying equilibrium satisfies the IC. The left panels indicate the fraction of senders who use clear
or buried signals (top two panels) and the fraction of receivers who accept the respective signal
(bottom two panels). The right panels provide stylized snapshots of the population at different
points in time. (a, b) Initially, no individual in the sender population sends a signal, and receivers
reject everyone. (a, c) Mutations and neutral drift make a substantial fraction of receivers accept
clear signals. As a response, high and medium types learn to send a clear signal, which in turn
leads strong receivers to reject individuals who send a clear signal. (a, d) Again by mutation and
neutral drift, both types of receivers learn to accept buried signals. High type senders adapt and
start using such signals. The resulting burying equilibrium is then stable, and no further change
occurs. The protocol and the used parameter values of these simulations are described in the
Methods.
Figure 4: A comparison of burying with classical signaling. a, To show that burying conveys
different information than standard costly signals, we allow senders either to use a signal S1 that
can be buried or sent clearly, or to send a more costly alternative signal S2 that is automatically
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sent clearly. In this extended model, burying (b) is still a possible equilibrium. However, this
model also allows for a classical signaling equilibrium, in which the high type sends S2, the
medium type sends the clear signal, and the low type sends no signal (c). d, To analyze the
conditions that allow for each of these two equilibrium configurations, we have first varied the
payoff that high senders get from strong receivers (x–axis) and from weak receivers (y–axis).
In the right region of the parameter space, high senders get a high absolute payoff from strong
receivers; here, classical signaling is an equilibrium. In the region below the main diagonal, high
senders get a high relative payoff from strong receivers (compared to the payoff they get from
weak receivers); here, burying can occur in equilibrium. In the lower panel, we show that classi-
cal signaling is additionally favored if high senders pay a low cost for the alternative signal S2,
whereas the burying equilibrium is favored if buried signals of high senders are likely to become
revealed.
Figure 5: Burying equilibria in a model with multiple burying devices. In many applications,
senders do not only choose whether or not to bury their signal, but also how much they would
like to bury. a, In the simplest case, we can model such a scenario by allowing senders to choose
between two possible burying devices. We assume that the second device has a lower revelation
probability. Hence we say that signals are ‘considerably buried’ with device 2, and ‘slightly
buried’ with device 1. If a buried signal becomes revealed, the receiver learns which burying
device has been used. b, Whether a burying equilibrium exists, and which burying device will
be used, again depends to which extent high and medium senders prefer interactions with strong
receivers. As in the baseline model, high senders need to derive a high payoff from partnering
with strong receivers, (i.e., the value of ahs/ahw depicted on the y-axis needs to be high). If
medium senders do not particularly value interactions with strong receivers (i.e., if the value
of ams/amw on the x–axis is low), it suffices for high senders to weakly bury their signal. As
medium senders become more interested in strong receivers, high senders are forced to bury
their signal considerably. c, Evolutionary simulations confirm these static predictions. We have
fixed the high senders’ preference for strong receivers (at ahs/ahw =3), and varied the medium
19
senders’ preference for strong receivers. Whenever slightly buried signals suffice to achieve
separation, high senders learn to use them. Simulation results are averaged over 15 individual
simulation runs, with each simulation run having 5 · 106 time periods.
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